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GETTING WHAT You PAY FOR: JUDICIAL COMPENSATION 
AND JUDICIAL INDEPENDENCE 
Jonathan L. Entin* 
I. INTRODUCTION 
One vital way of assuring judicial independence is to guarantee that judges 
need not fear that their salaries will be reduced if they render unpopular or 
controversial decisions. The United States Constitution seeks to do this by 
providing that all federal judges "shall, at stated Times, receive for their Services, a 
Compensation, which shall not be diminished during their Continuance in Office."' 
As the Supreme Court explained in perhaps the leading case on the Compensation 
Clause, "[a] Judiciary free from control by the Executive and the Legislature is 
essential if there is a right to have claims decided by judges who are free from 
potential domination by otherbranches of government."2 
• © 2011 Jona~han L. Entin, Professor of Law and Political Science, Case Western 
Reserve University. E-mail: jle@case.edu. 
This is a revised version of the paper I presented at a conference on Judicial 
Independence in Times of Crisis at the S.J. Quinney College of Law at the University of 
Utah in October 2010. Thanks to Shimon Shetreet and Christopher Forsyth for inviting me 
to participate and to Hiram Chodosh, Wayne McCormack, and everyone else at the S.J. 
Quinney College of Law for their efficiency and hospitality. Errors of commission, 
omission, and interpretation are mine alone. 
1 U.S. CaNST. art. III, § 1 (emphasis added). State judges enjoy similar protections 
against reduction in compensation. See, e.g., OHIO CONST. art. IV, § 6(B) ("The judges of 
the Supreme Court, courts of appeals, courts of common pleas, and divisions thereof, and 
of all courts of record established by law, shall, at stated times, receive for their services 
such compensation as may be provided by law, which shall not be diminished during their 
term of office."); UTAH CaNST. art. VIII, .§ 14 ("The legislature shall provide for the 
compensation of all justices and judges. The salaries of justices and judges shall not be 
diminished during their terms of office."); see also infra notes 30, 44 and accompanying 
text. 
2 United States v. Will, 449 U.S. 200, 217-18 (1980). Alexander Hamilton made a 
similar point: ''Next to permanency in office, nothing can contribute more to the 
independence of judges than a fixed provision for their support." THE FEDERALIST No. 79, 
at 472 (Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961). Indeed, federal judges do enjoy 
"permanency in office": the language immediately preceding the Compensation Clause 
provides that these officials "shall hold their Offices during good Behaviour." U.S. CONST. 
art. III, § 1. 
It is not clear that "permanency in office" matters as much as Hamilton suggested. As 
Justice Story explained, "Without [the Compensation Clause], the other [constitutional 
provision], as to the tenure of office, would have been utterly nugatory, and indeed a mere 
mockery." 3 JOSEPH STORY, COMMENTARJES ON THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED 
STATES § 1622, at 490 (Da Capo Press 1970) (i833). State judges typically do not enjoy 
life tenure but do enjoy protection against salary reduction. See, e.g., OHIO CaNST. art. IV, 
25 
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The Compensation Clause does not forbid increases in judicial pay; rather it 
prohibits only reductions in judges' salaries. This aspect of the clause tmdoubtedly 
reflects the notion that the prospect of a pay cut poses a greater threat to judicial 
independence than does a pay raise. 3 While the prospect of a salary increase also 
could influence a judge's rulings,4 the framers debated at length the propriety of 
allowing for increasing judicial pay before deciding to omit any reference to that 
matter from the Compensation Clause. 5 
The apparent simplicity of the language of the federal Compensation Clause 
and its state counterparts conceals several troublesome issues. 6 Part II of this 
Article will address when a judicial salary . becomes vested and thus no longer 
susceptible to reduction. Part III considers whether taxation of judicial salaries can 
amount to an unconstitutional diminution in compensation. Part IV focuses on the · 
extent to which withholding cost-of-living increases impermissibly reduces judicial 
pay. Even in situations that do· not violate the Compensation Clause, questions 
§ 6(A)-(B); UTAH CONST. art. VIII, §§ 9, 14. Indeed, most state judges must face the 
electorate at some point to obtain or retain their positions. See Methods of Judicial 
·Selection, AM. JUDICATURE Soc'Y, http://www.judicialselection.us/judicial_selection/ 
methods/selection_ of_judges.cfin?state= (last visited Jan. 19, 2011 ). In a previous 
symposium paper, I suggested that whether judges are elected or appointed matters less 
than how politically salient the judiciary is at any particular moment in history. See 
Jonathan L. Entin, Judicial Selection and Political Citlture, 30 CAP. U. L. REv. 523 (2002). 
Whatever the accuracy of that assessment, resolving the debate over whether judges should 
be elected or appointed is beyond the scope of this paper. 
3 In Hamilton's words, "a power over a man's subsistence amounts to a power over 
his will." THE FEDERALIST No. 79, supra note 2, at 472. 
4 Cf Caperton v. A.T. Massey Coal Co., 129 S. Ct. 2252, 2264-65 (2009) (holding 
that a state supreme court justice should have recused himself from a case in which the 
chairman, CEO, and president of a company that was about to appeal a $50 million 
judgment spent $3 million in support of that justice's election); Tumey v. Ohio, 273 U.S. 
510, 531-32 (1927) (concluding that a judge who has a direct pecuniary interest in the 
outcome of a case-in this instance by receiving additional compensation from fees 
. assessed against defendants whom the judge finds guilty when no such fees are assessed 
against defendants whom the judge finds not guilty-may not conduct judicial 
proceedings). 
5 See Jonathan L. Entin & Erik M. Jensen,. Taxation, Compensation, and Judicial 
Independence, 56 CASE W. REs. L. REv. 965, 971-75 (2006). State counterparts to the 
federal Compensation Clause similarly allow for judicial pay raises. See, e.g., state 
constitutions cited supra note 1. 
6 The relationship between judicial compensation and judicial independence has 
generated controversy outside the United States. See, e.g., Provincial Judges Ass'n of New 
Brunswick v. New Brunswick, [2005] 2 S.C.R. 286, paras. 8-12 (Can.) (addressing 
compensation issues in four Canadian provinces where the government had rejected 
proposed increases in judicial pay); In re Remuneration of Judges of the Provincial Court 
(P.E.I.), [1997] 3 S.C.R. 3, paras. 5, 110-185 (Can.) (holding that reductions in judicial 
salaries made to reduce budget deficits were impermissible and concluding that the salary 
recommendations of independent commissions established to improve processes that 
ensure judicial independence need not be binding). 
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about how much to pay judges, as well as how often and by what process judicial 
salaries should be increased, present potentially significant policy issues. Part V 
considers some of those questions, and suggests tl:iat the case for raising judges' 
pa~ ~hou1d _not rest exclusively or even primarily on the financial aspects of 
,:,,;I .. ro-ta 1 CPMT1i"'P j UUJ.\.Il.U.L oj'....,.L '.._..,...._.... 
II. VESTING OF JUDICIAL SALARIES 
The Supreme Court has established that judicial salaries vest for purposes of 
the Compensation Clause when they take effect. Proposed pay raises may be 
rescinded before their effective date, but once they have gone into effect any such 
raises may not be revoked. This is the lesson of United States v. Will. 7 Remarkably, 
·the issue did not reach the Court until 1980, riearly two centuries after the 
ratification of the Constitution.8 
At issue in Will were appropriations acts for four consecutive fiscal years that 
purported to forbid pay raises for federal judges.9 On October 1, 1976, the first day 
of fiscal year 1977, the president signed a bill that contained a prohibition on 
judicial pay increases. 10 On July 11, 1977, the president signed a similar bill that 
forbade judicial pay raises for fiscal year 1978, which was to begin on October 1, 
1977. 11 On September 30, 1978, the president signed analogous legislation to 
repeal a judicial salary hike for fiscal year 1979, which was to begin the next day 
(October 1, 1978).12 Finally, on October 12, 1979, the president signed legislation 
that reduced the amount of a judicial pay raise for fiscal year 1980, which had 
begun on October 1, 1979.13 
More. than a dozen federal district judges filed class actions challenging all 
four of these measures. 14 The Supreme Court concluded that the judicial pay raises 
for fiscal years 1977 and 1980 "had taken effect, since [they were] operative with 
the start of the month-and the new fiscal year. " 15 This was true for fiscal year 
7 449 u.s. 200 (1980). 
8 Id. at 221 (noting that the case posed a question "never before addressed by this 
Court"). 
9 Id. Those measures also affected members of Congress and the executive branch, 
but the Constitution does not forbid pay cuts for those officials. 
10 Id. at 205-06. 
11 Id. at 206-07. 
12 Id. at 207-08. 
13 Id. at 208-09. 
14 Id. at 209-10 & nn.7-8. 
15 Id. at 224-25 (fiscal year 1977); id. at 230 (fiscal year 1980). Before reaching the 
merits, the Court concluded that it could decide the case even though every justice had a 
financial interest in the outcome. Id: at 210. The challenges to these appropriations riders 
were class actions on behalf of all Article III judges who were on the bench during the 
relevant time periods. See id. at 209. The justices concluded that, under the Rule of 
Necessity, they had an obligation to decide the case. Id. at 217. The correctness and 
propriety of this conclusion are beyond the scope of this Article. 
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1977 even though the appropriations bill had become law just a few hours into the 
budget period, on October 1. The bill "purported to repeal a salary increase already 
in force." 16 And while the fiscal year 1977 and fiscal year 1980 riders also applied 
to congressional and executive salaries, the absence of discrimination against 
judges was irrelevant: the other officials did not enjoy the protection against salary 
reduction that the Compensation Clause affords to the judiciary.17 By contrast, the 
laws applicable to fiscal years 1978 and 1979 passed constitutional muster-in 
both instances, the president had signed the measures before October 1, the first 
day of the fiscal year. 18 
Why the different results? The Court explained that "a salary increase 'vests' 
for purposes of the Compensation Clause only when it takes effect as part of the 
compensation due and payable to Article III judges." 19 Under the statute that 
governed judicial compensation at the time, salaries became effective on October 
1, the first day of the fiscal year.20 Accordingly, the fiscal year 1977 pay raise had 
gone into effect and could not be revoked later in the day?1 In addition, the fiscal 
year 1980 increase had been effective for nearly two weeks when Congress tried to 
eliminate it. 22 On the other hand, a rescission that takes effect even on the very last 
day of the previous fiscal year can prevent a judicial salary increase from taking 
effect at the start of the new fiscal year. That is why the fiscal year 1979 rider was 
pennissible. 23 The fiscal year 1978 measure was even more clearly pem1issible 
because it had been adopted nearly three months in advance of the compensation 
hike's effective date_24 
In shorl, Congress may not lower judges' salaries, but it has broad discretion 
to grant or withhold judicial pay raises before the beginning of the fiscal year. This 
was especially true because the proposed pay raises resulted from the application 
of a formula that applied only prospectively, with the start of the new fiscal year. 
To hold that Congress must apply the formula would show disrespect for a 
"coequal branch[]" and necessarily imply that "the Judicial Branch could 
16 I d. at 225. 
17 Id. at 226. The president's compensation was not affected by these appropriations 
riders. A separate constitutional provision freezes the chief executive's compensation 
during his term of office. U.S. CONST. art. II,§ 1, cl. 7 (providing that the president's salary 
"shall neither be increased nor diminished during the Period for which he shall have been 
elected"). A subsequently ratified constitutional amendment would have prevented any 
change in congressional salaries until after the next biennial election. Id. amend. XXVII 
(prohibiting the passage of any measure "varying the compensation for the services of the 
Senators and Representatives . . . until an election of Representatives shall have 
intervened"). 
18 Will, 449 U.S. at 226, 229. 
19 Id. at 229. 
20 Id. at 204. 
21 Id. at 226. 
22 Id. at 230. 
23 Id. at 229. 
24 Id. 
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command Congress to carry out an announced future intent as to a decision the 
Constitution vests exclusively in the Congress."25 
Similar issues have arisen at the state level, where courts also have enforced 
judicial salary protections analogous to those in the federal Compensation Clause .. 
A recent example comes from Pennsylvania. In Commonwealth v. Stilp,26 the state 
supreme court rebuffed an effort to roll back a pay raise four months after it had 
gone into effect. In July 2005, the Pennsylvania General Assembly, literally in the 
middle of the night and without debate, passed a bill that raised salaries of 
legislators, many executive officials, and judges. 27 In a remarkable piece of judicial 
understatement, the court described voter reaction as "negative. "28 Shortly after the 
November 2005 election, the legislature repealed the controversial measure.Z9 
The Pennsylvania Constitution contains a clause providing that judges' 
compensation "shall not be diminished during their terms of office, unless by law 
applying generally to all safaried officers of the Commonwealth."30 Because of the 
italicized exception, no analogue of which appears in the federal Compensation 
Clause, the comi discerned two issues: (1) whether the repeal diminished judicial 
compensation, and (2) whether the exception applied.31 The first issue, the court 
observed, "need not detain us long." 32 The challenged measure quite clearly 
"reduced [judicial] salaries during the judges' terms of office" to the levels that 
existed before middle-of-the-night passage of the July pay raise.33 
The more complicated issue related to the applicability of the exception for 
general pay cuts for all salaried state officers. The exception served as "a failsafe 
during a state-wide economic crisis,"34 not as a legitimate reaction to "a political 
backlash." 35 Pennsylvania faced no "dire financial circumstances," 36 so the 
exception could not justify repeal of the judicial pay raise. Even if the legislators 
had acted in "good faith," their motivation did not matter.37 Ally other conclusion 
would leave "no barrier preventing [them] from pursuing other means of attacking 
25 Id. at 228. 
26 905 A.2d 918 (Pa. 2006). 
27 See id. at 925. The measure adopted formulas for determining compensation levels 
for officials in all three branches effective immediately. !d. 
28 Id. In fact, two Pennsylvania Supreme Court justices had difficult retention 
elections later in the year. One justice was defeated, and the other survived "by an 
unusually narrow margin." Id at 926. 
29 Id. 
30 PA. CONST. art. V, § 16(a) (emphasis added). 
31 Stilp, 905 A.2d at 939. . 
32 Id. Before addressing the merits, the court, relying in part on Will, concluded that 
the Rule of Necessity authorized the justices to decide the case despite their financial stake 
in the outcome. I d. at 929. 
33 Id. at 939. 
34 Id. at 948. 
35 Id. at 944. 
36 Id at 940. 
37 Id. at 944. 
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the independence of the Judiciary."38 Beyond these general concems, the repeal 
measure did not fit within the terms of the exception because it did not actually 
apply to "all salaried officers of the Commonwealth. "39 The original bill, which 
had generated so much controversy, applied to judges and legislators effective 
immediately, but executive salaries would not go up until more than a yeat later.40 
Because the repeal measure reduced only judicial and legislative pay, it did not 
qualifY under the constitutional exemption for general rollbacks in compensation.41 
Accordingly,· the judicial salary increases provided in the controversial July law 
remained in effect. 42 
While Stilp follows the analytical framework laid down in Will, some state 
courts have followed a more robust approach that might have invalidated even the 
pre-October 1 rescissions that Will found to be compatible with the federal 
Compensation Clause. For example, in Jorgensen v. Blagojevich43 the Supreme 
Court of Illinois found that efforts to prevent judicial salary increases from taking 
effect before the start of the fiscal year violated the Compensation Clause of the 
state constitution.44 The issue arose when Govemor Blagojevich sought to block 
cost-of-living increases for judges that had been authorized by law for fiscal years 
2003 and 2004. Before the start of fiscal year 2003, the legislature suspended cost-
of-living increases for all state officials.45 Later, however, both chambers passed a 
bill restoring the raise for judges only, but the govemor vetoed that bill. 46 
38 !d. 
39 !d. at 946. 
40 !d. at 947. 
41 /d. The court also concluded that the original bill's provlSlons applicable to 
legislators violated a constitutional prohibition against mid-term pay raises for members of 
the Pennsylvania General Assembly. !d. .at 970. Finally, the court refused to enforce the 
nonseverability clause 1n the July pay-raise bill. !d. at 980. This ruling had particular 
significance for the fate of the judicial pay provisions because of the court's conclusion that 
the section of the pay-raise bill relating to legislators was unconstitutional. If the 
nonseverability clause were enforced, the judicial salary increases also would have been 
struck down. That would have rendered superfluous the November repeal measure and 
meant that judges' compensation should never have increased. 
42 See id. at 949. 
43 811 N.E.2d 652 (Ill. 2004). It should be noted that this case arose several years 
before Governor Blagojevich found himself in such hot legal water that he was impeached 
and removed from office by the state legislature and put on trial for political co1ruption. 
See John Chase & Stacy St. Clair, A Politician's Rise, Hard Fall, CHI. TRIB., Jan. 30, 2009, 
at 4; Malcolm Gay & Susan Saulny, Blagojevich Is Removed by Illinois Senate, 59-0, 
N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 30, 2009, at A19. It should also be noted that the governor's earlier 
actions in connection with judicial compensation played no role in his impeachment and 
criminal proceedings. 
44 Jorgensen, 811 N.E.2d at 670; see also ILL. CONST. art. VI, § 14 ("Judges shall 
receive salaries provided by law which shall not be diminished to take effect during their 
terms of office."). 
45 Jorgensen, 811 N.E.2d at 655. 
46 !d. at 655-56. 
2011] 
Meanwh 
that yem 
living in• 
The 
aside the 
Under I 
legislatu: 
salaries 
standard: 
to be co 
became l 
living in· 
before 01 
The 
diminish 
the salm 
disagree1 
the begi 
question: 
whether 
withhold 
inflation 
address t 
The 
whether 
47 fa 
but the g< 
had begw 
48 fa 
it could c 
part ofth• 
49 JiV 
court, the 
50 !c. 
the legis!: 
51 !c. 
52 s, 
53 c 
been am 
505, 506 
generals 
[N0.1 
oncems, the repeal 
: it did not actually 
original bill, which 
.egislators effective 
: than a yeat later.40 
.tive pay, it did not 
0 ° 41 ; m compensatiOn. 
1troversial July law 
in Will, some state 
invalidated even the 
le with the federal 
~vich 43 the Supreme 
1creases from taking 
sation Clause of the 
·ich sought to block 
· law for fiscal years 
ture suspended cost-
ll chambers passed a 
vetoed that bill. 46 
WlStons applicable to 
' raises for members of 
refused to enforce the 
; ruling had particular 
court's conclusion that 
nconstitutional. If the 
also would have been 
·er repeal measure and 
ase arose several years 
that he was impeached 
for political corruption. 
HI. TRIB., Jan. 30, 2009, 
; Illinois Senate, 59-0, 
' the governor's earlier 
n his impeachment and 
VI, § 14 ("Judges shall 
take effect during their 
2011] GETTING WHATYOUPAYFOR 31 
Meanwhile, two days after the start of fiscal year 2004, the governor deleted from 
that year's appropriation bill the funds that would have covered annual cost-of-
living increases for judges.47 
The Supreme Colli"'i of Illinois held that the state could not v,rithhold the cost-
of-living increases for either year.48 It did not matter whether the measures setting 
aside the pay raises had been enacted before or after the start of the fiscal year . 
Under Illinois law, those increases had vested years earlier. 49 In 1990, the 
legislature approved a report by the Compensation Review Board, which set 
salaries for various state officials (including judges). 50 That report contained 
standards for adjusting salaries and made clear that cost-of-living increases "were 
to be considered a component of salary fully vested at the time the . . . report 
became law. "51 Under the circumstances, state judges were entitled to their cost-of-
. living increases whether the governor's efforts to block those increases took place 
before or after the first day of the applicable fiscal year. 52 
These cases establish a baseline principle: constitutional prohibitions against 
diminishing judicial compensation mean that the other branches may not reduce 
the salaries paid to judges once those salaries have vested. There might be 
disagreement about when those salaries vest but, at a minimum, it is clear that after 
the beginning of the fiscal year salaries may not be reduced. 53 More difficult 
questions have arisen with respect to whether judicial salaries may be taxed and 
whether compensation is unconstitutionally reduced when the other branches 
withhold cost-of-living increases for a prolonged period of time during which 
inflation erodes the purchasing power of the nominal salary. The ne~t two parts 
address these questions. 
III. TAXING JUDICIAL SALARIES 
The Supreme Court struggled for more than eighty years with the question of 
whether imposing taxes on the salaries of federal judges violated the 
47 I d. The legislature enacted the appropriations bill before the start of the fi~cal year, 
but the governor did not use what is known as a "reduction veto" until after the fiscal year 
had begun. Id. at 656. 
48 Id. at 665. Before addressing the merits, this court followed Will and concluded that 
it could decide the case under the Rule of Necessity even though all of its members were 
part of the plaintiff classes for fiscal year 2003 and fiscal year 2004. I d. at 660. 
49 Will did not control resolution of the issue of vesting. According to the Illinois 
court, the vesting issue was controlled by state law. Id. at 664. 
50 Id. at 655. The board's salary determinations go into effect unless both houses of 
the legislature reject or alter them within a specified statutory period. Id. at 654. 
51 Id. at 664. 
52 See id. at 665. 
53 Courts have permitted a reduction in the amount of a judge's pay when there has 
been a mistake in determining the judge's salary. See, e.g., Maddox v. Hayes, 598 S.E.2d 
505, 506-07 (Ga. 2004). Cases like this present the only exception I have found to the 
general statement in the text. 
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Compensation Clause. 54 The problem arose in the wake of the adoption of the 
Sixteenth Amendment, which authorized the federal government to levy taxes "on 
incomes, from whatever source derived," and without regard to the appmiionment 
requirement for direct taxes. 55 · 
- In Evans v. Gore, 56 a 1920 case, the Court held that Congress could not 
constitutionally extend the federal income tax to Article III judges. The case was 
brought by a federal district judge who had been oh the bench for tWo decades 
when the tax was imposed. 57 By requiring the judge to remit the tax after receiving 
his pay, the government was, for all practical purposes, reducing his salary: "Was 
he not placed in practically the same situation as if [the money] had been withheid 
in the first instance? Only by subordinating substance to mere form could it be held 
that his compensation was not diminished." 58 The whole point of the 
Compensation Clause was that "the judge shall have a sure and continuing right to 
the compensation, whereon he confidently may rely for his support during his 
continuance in office, so that he need have no apprehension lest his situation in this 
regard may be changed to his disadvantage. "59 
Five years later, in Miles v. Graham,60 the Court ruled that the income tax 
could not constitutionally be applied to a judge who was appointed after the 
enactment of the tax. Justice McReynolds explained that the timing of the judge's 
appoinhnent made no difference to the Compensation Clause analysis: Congress 
must fix judicial salaries, after which "the amount specified becomes the 
compensation which is protected against diminution during [the judges'] 
continuance in office." 61 Because the tax diminished the judge's ·pay, it was 
invalid.62 
Miles v. Graham did not last long as a precedent. For one thing, the challenge 
was brought by a judge of the old Court of Claims. At the time, both the parties 
54 The issue flared briefly when Chief Justice Taney objected to paying the income 
tax that was imposed during the Civil War. The issue was never litigated, but in 1873 the 
federal government refunded the taxes that federal judges had paid. See Entin & Jensen, 
supra note 5, at 979-81. 
55 U.S. CONST. amend. XVI. On the apportionment requirement, see Erik M. Jensen, 
The Apportionment of "Direct Taxes": Are Consumption Taxes Constitutional?, 
97 COUJlvL L. REv. 2334, 2339-41 (1997). The Sixteenth Amendment was adopted to 
overrule Pollock v. Farmers' Loan & Trust Co., 158 U.S. 601 (1895), which invalidated a 
nineteenth-century income tax because it was an unapportioned direct tax. The income tax 
at issue in Pollock was not the tax that was imposed during the Civil War, the validity of 
which was never litigated. See supra note 54. 
56 253 U.S. 245 (1920), overruled by United States v. Hatter, 532 U.S. 557 (2001). 
57 Id. at 246. 
58 Id. at 254. 
59 I d. at 249. 
60 268 U.S. 501 (1925), overruled by O'Malley v. Woodrough, 307 U.S. 277 (1939). 
61 Id. at 509. 
62 Id. 
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and the Supreme Court assumed that the Court of Claims was an Article III 
tribunal, and therefore its members were covered by the Compensation Clause.63 
Eight years later, however, the Supreme Court held that the Court· of Claims was 
an Article I court, so its members were not protected by the Compensation 
Clause.64 Nevertheless, by the time Congress established the Court of Claims as an 
Article III body,65 Miles v. Graham had been overruled. 
In 1939, O'Malley v. Woodrough 66 upheld the taxation of the salary of a 
federal circuit judge who took office after the relevant tax statute was enacted.67 
Seeking to avoid the judicial tax immunity recognized in Evans v. Gore, 68 
Congress limited the statute's coverage to Article III judges who were appointed 
after its effective date. 69 Justice Frankfurter could scarcely conceal his incredulity 
at the view that subjecting newly appointed judges to a nondiscriminatory, pre-
existing income tax might compromise judicial independence. The tax merely 
"charge[s] them with the common duties of citizenship, by making "them b,ear their 
aliquot share of the cost of maintaining the Government."70 The contrary position 
"trivialize[ s] the great historic experience on which the framers based the 
safeguards of Article III, § 1."71 The opinion concluded by observing that, if any of 
its reasoning was "inconsistent with what was said in Miles v. Graham, [that 
decision] cannot survive."72 In short, Miles v. Graham was overruled. Curiously, 
all of the criticism that 0 'Malley v. Woodrough had heaped on that case 
applied equally to Evans v. Gore, but the Court said nothing about the earlier 
case's vitality. 73 It took more than sixty additional years for the Court to repudiate 
Evans v. Gore. . 
Its end came in the 2001 case of United States v. Hatter/4 which chaiienged 
the extension of Medicare and Social Security taxes to sitting federal judges. 
Before 1983, Article III judges-as well as most other federal employees-were 
exempt from both taxes.75 Eight federal judges, who were on the bench when the 
change took place, claimed that extending Medicare and Social Security taxes to 
63 See id. at 502 (government); id. at 503 (Judge Graham); id. at 505 (Supreme Court). 
64 Williams v. United States, 289 U.S. 553, 569-70 (1933). 
65 Act of July 28, 1953, ch. 253, § 1, 67 Stat. 226, 226 (codified as amended at 28 
U.S.C. § 171 (2006)). 
66 307 U.S. 277 (1939). 
67 W oodrough had been a district judge when the tax statute was adopted and was 
appointed to the court of appeals after the enactment of the tax law. The Court found this 
fact "wholly irrelevant to the matter in issue." Id. at 279-80. 
68 Id. at 280. 
69 !d. at 281-82. 
70 Id. at 282. 
11 Id. 
72 Id. at 283 (citation omitted). 
73 See Entin & Jensen, supra note 5, at 988-89. 
74 532 u.s. 557 (2001). 
75 Id. at 561-62. 
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· them violated the Compensation Clause.76 The Hatter Court concluded that Evans 
v. Gore had misapprehended the scope of the prohibition against diminution of 
judicial salaries and must be overruled. 77 The Constitution does not forbid "a 
nondiscririllnatory tax that treat[s] judges the same way it treat[s] other citizens."78 
Tw-ning to the merits, the Court had little difficulty upholding the extension of 
Medicare taxes to Article III judges as part of a statute that also brought most other 
federal workers, who previously had been exempt, into that program.79 The Social 
Security tax extension was another matter. Although that change brought 
previously exempt federal workers undey Social Security, it also effectively 
insulated virtually all newly eligible workers-except for federal judges-from 
additional payroll taxes. 80 As a result, the Social Security extension discriminated 
against federal judges and thereby ran afoul of the Compensation Clause.81 
As a practical rp.atter, Hatter makes it unlikely that taxation issues will 
intersect with the Compensation Clause in the future. Hatter allows Congress to 
impose nondiscriminatory taxes on federal judges but prohibits the imposition of 
taxes that target the judiciary, which seems to be a highly unlikely prospect. The 
main qualification to this assessment concerns the purpose of the Compensation 
Clause. To the extent that this provision is meant to safeguard judicial 
independence, it is difficult to envision a scenario under which Congress would 
enact a tax that discriminates against federal judges, no matter how controversial 
or unpopular the judges' rulings might be. 
Lurking in these cases, however, is another rationale for the Compensation 
Clause: to attract excellent lawyers to the bench. This was part of the rationale for 
the decision in Evans v. Gore. Justice Van Devanter's majority opinion in that case 
quoted Chancellor Kent's observation that the prohibition on diminution of judicial 
salaries serves "to secure a succession of learned men on the bench."82 Although 
Evans v. Gore has been overruled, the Court continues to endorse this rationale for 
the Compensation Clause. Indeed, Hatter endorsed this aspect of the Evans 
opinion83 just three paragraphs after announcing that Evans was no longer good 
76 !d. at 564. 
77 !d. at 571. 
78 !d. at 569. 
79 !d. at 572. 
80 See id. at 562-64, 572-73. 
81 !d. at 576. All seven justices who partiCipated in Hatter agreed that extending 
Social Security taxes to sitting Article III judges violated the Compensation Clause. See id. 
at 581 (Scalia, J., concurring in pirrt and dissenting in part); id. at 586-87 (Thomas, J., 
concurring in the judgment in part and dissenting in part). 
82 Evans v. Gore, 253 U.S. 245, 253 (1920) (quoting 1 JAMES KENT, COMMENTARIES 
ON .AMERICAN LAW *294), overruled by United States v. Hatter, 532 U.S. 557 (2001). 
Justice Van Devanter added that the Compensation Clause'.s "primary purpose" was "to 
attract good and competent men to the bench and to promote that independence of action 
and judgment which is essential" to the proper administration of justice. !d. 
83 532 U.S. at 568. 
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84 In addition to possibly deterring outstanding lawyers from considering 
.• w. s on the bench, stagnant judicial salaries have fueled widespread concern and caree~ated litigation claiming that persistent failure to raise judicial salaries has led 
gen ignificant erosion in judges' purchasing power, which is said to represent 
to s . . . h" h . f h " t. 1'1 nr : onst1"tutional dimmutwn w1t m t e meanmg o t e ,_.ompensa.wn ~.ause. vv c 
.. lillC · 
turn next to that issue. 
IV. WITHHOLDING COST-OF-LIVING INCREASES 
The Compensation Clause implications of inflation were foreshadowed in yet 
another way in Hatter. After concluding that the extension of Social Security taxes 
to sitting federal judges constituted an impermissible diminution in judicial pay, 
the Court rejected the government's argument that subsequent pay raises, which 
exceeded the cost of the new taxes, served to remedy the violation. Citing statistics 
showing that judges' pay had risen less than the rise in the Consumer Price Index 
and less than private-sector salaries had gone up over a three-decade period, 85 
Justice Breyer concluded that "the judicial salary increases [cited by the 
government] simply reflected a congressional effort to restore ... to judges ... 
some, but not all, of the real compensation that inflation had eroded." 86 
Accordingly, those increases could not be used to justifY the extension of Social 
Security taxes to judges in violation of the Compensation Clause.87 
As it happens, at the time of the Hatter decision, Williams v. United States,88 a 
case addressing the erosion in the real value of judicial salaries, was making its 
way thro1,1gh the system. Williams rejected a Compensation Clause challenge to 
congressional action setting aside several cost-of-living increases in judicial 
salaries: The case arose under the Ethics Reform Act of 1989,89 which est~blished 
a new system for determining judges' pay. That statute raised judicial 
compensation by 25% to make up for the effects of inflation. 90 In addition, 
beginning January 1, 1991, it provided for cost-of-living increases for federal 
judges in any year that civil service employees received such salary adjustments.91 
84 !d. at 567. 
85 !d. at 579. Federal district judges' pay increased by 253% between 1969 and 1999; 
the Consumer Price Index rose by 363% and private-sector salaries went up by 421% 
during the same time period. Id 
86 Id 
87 Id at 581. 
88 240 F.3d 1019 (Fed. Cir. 2001). 
89 Pub. L. No. 101-194, 103 Stat. 1716 (1989). 
90 !d.§ 703(a)(3), 103 Stat. at 1768 (codrfied at 5 U.S.C. § 5318 note (2006)). 
91 Id § 704(a)(2)(A), 103 Stat. at 1769 (codified as amended at 28 U.S.C. § 461 
(2006)). The statute also strictly limited outside income and forbade the acceptance of 
honoraria. !d. § 601, 103 Stat. at 1760 (codified at 5 U.S. C. app. § 501 (2006)). 
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Although judges received cost-of-living adjustments for several years, Congress 
passed legislation blocking raises in 1995, 1996, 1997, and 1999.92 
A group of federal district judges filed the Williams suit, claiming that 
withholding cost-of-living adjustments unconstitutionally diminished their 
comuensation.93 Reversin2: the district court. the United States Court of Anneals 
.L ....... ~ .. J. 
for the Federal Circuit held that Will controlled the dispute and doomed the judges' 
claims: the blocking statutes were enacted before January 1 of each relevant year, 
so the cost-of-living increases for those years never took effect.94 
The Supreme Court denied certiorari, over the dissent of three justices. 95 With 
the support of Justices Scalia and Kennedy, Justice Breyer (who wrote for the 
Court in Hatter), wrote a twelve-page opinion suggesting that Williams raised 
important issues that deserved plenary consideration. 96 Part of Justice Breyer's 
reasoning drew on Justice Scalia's partial dissent in Hatter, which emphasized that 
the exemption from taxation "was part of [the judges'] employment package.'m In 
Justice Breyer's view, the Ethics Reform Act "mandates adjustments to judicial 
salaries; the adjustments are mechanical and precise; and they are to take place 
automatically," subject to very limited statutory exceptions that would deny similar 
increases in the compensation of federal civil service employees. 98 This 
alTangement differed significantly from the statutory scheme at issue in Will, 
which was, in Breyer's view, "neither definite nor precise."99 Accordingly, the 
Ethics Refonn Act could be seen as embodying a congressional commitment "to 
protect federal judges against undue diminishment in real pay by providing cost-
92 Williams, 240 F.3d at 1024. In addition, civil service employees did not receive a 
raise in 1994, so neither did judges. !d. 
93 !d. 
94 !d. at 1031 ("[E]ach of these unambiguous laws ... was passed by Congress and 
approved by the President before the January 1 date that the [cost-of-living adjustments] 
were to take effect. Under Will, put simply, that is the end of our inquiry, and the Judges' 
cause must fail."). The district comi had granted summary judgment to the plaintiff judges. 
Williams v. United States, 48 F. Supp. 2d 52, 60-61 (D.D.C. 1999). The Federal Circuit 
panel was divided: a dissenting judge argued that the court should uphold the legislative 
compromise embodied in the Ethics Reform Act. Williams, 240 F.3d at 1040 (Plager, J., 
dissenting). 
95 Williams v. United States, 535 U.S. 911 (2002). 
96 !d. at 911. 
97 United States v. Hatter, 532 U.S. 557, 585 (2001) (Scalia, J., concurring in part and 
dissenting in part); see Williams, 535 U.S. at 916-17 (Breyer, J., dissenting from denial of 
certiorari). Justice Scalia had agreed with the Hatter majority that extending Social 
Security taxes to sitting federal judges violated the Compensation Clause, but he contended 
that the Medicare tax extension was also unconstitutional. Hatter, 532 U.S. at 581 (Scalia, 
J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). 
98 Williams, 535 U.S. at 912 (Breyer, J., dissenting from denial of certiorari). 
99 !d. at 917. The scheme in Will, which had been superseded by the Ethics Reform 
Act, "was imprecise as to amount and uncertain as to effect" because the process for 
determining whether to increase salaries involved several different actors, each of whom 
could reject a recommended pay raise. See id. 
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of-living adjustments to guarantee that their salaries would not fall too far behind 
inflation," 100 and the blocking statutes that withheld those adjustments could be 
conshued as breaching that congressional comniihnent in violation of the 
. Cl 101 Compensatwn ause. . · 
r,... ""~rlition fHihm.~ to raise iudicial salaries had caused genuine economic JJ..I. ....... ~..._.. ......... .._. __ , ------ -- ------ J -
harm. The real value of federal district judges' pay had declined by nearly 25% 
since 1969, leaving judicial compensation "below that of typical mid-level (and a 
few first-year) law firm associates and many law school teachers and 
administrators, [while] the real compensation earned by the average private sector 
worker has increased, as has that in nearly all employment categories outside high 
levels of Govemment."102 To reinforce his point, Breyer attached three charts as an 
appendix to his opinion. 103 
Meanwhile, in late 2001 Congress made permanent the language of a 1981 
appropriations rider requiring specific legislative approval for any judicial pay 
increase. 104 This development changed the process for awarding cost-of-living 
increases for federal judges from a presumption in favor of such adjustments, the 
system embodied in the Ethics Reform Act, to a presumption against them. 
Moreover, the change affected only federal judges. Under the reasoning of Hatter, 
which focused on whether Congress had "impose[ d] a special legislative burden 
upon [judges'] salaries alone," 105 singling out the judiciary for less favorable 
100 !d. at 920 (emphasis omitted) (citation omitted). 
101 See id. at 921. 
102 Id. at 920. 
103 These charts were bound into volume 535 of the U.S. Reports between pages 922 
and 923. 
104 Departments of Commerce, Justice, and State, the Judiciary, and Related Agencies 
Appropriations Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-77, § 625, 115 Stat: 748, 803 (2001). The 
rider provides: 
Notwithstanding any other provision of law or of this joint resolution, none 
of the funds appropriated by this joint resolution or by any other Act shall be 
obligated or expended to increase, after the date of enactment of this joint 
resolution, any salary of any Federal judge or Justice of the Supreme Court, 
except as may be specifically authorized by Act of Congress hereafter enacted: 
Provided, That nothing in this limitation shall be construed to reduce any salary 
which may be in effect at the time of enactment of this joint resolution nor shall 
this limitation be construed in any manner to reduce the salary of any Federal 
judge or of any Justice of the Supreme Court. This section shall apply to fiscal 
year 1981 and each fiscal year thereafter. · 
28 U.S.C. § 461 note (2006). This provision originated as part of a continuing resolution 
for fiscal year 1982. H.R.J. Res. 370, Pub. L. No. 97-92, § 140, 95 Stat. 1183, 1200 (1981). 
105 Williams, 535 U.S. at 918 (Breyer, J., dissenting from denial of certiorari); see also 
United States v. Hatter, 532 U.S. 557, 572 (200 1) (emphasizing that the extension of Social 
Security taxes to sitting judges "discriminate[ d] against [those] judges in a manner 
forbidden by the [Compensation] Clause"). 
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treatment in connection with cost-of-living adjustments might well violate the 
Compensation Clause. Perhaps the answer to that question depends on whether, as 
Justice Breyer's dissent from the denial of certiorari in Williams suggested, the 
judges' constitutional entitlement to cost-of-living increases vested with the 
passage of the Ethics Reform Act106 or, as Will concluded, only on the effective 
date of any judicial pay raise authorized by Congress. 107 · 
It is possible that we will soon get an authoritative response from the Supreme 
Court. After Congress failed to increase judicial salaries for 2007, another group of 
judges. (including Judge Hatter) filed a new lawsuit alleging that their 
compensation had been diminished unconstitutionally. 108 In Beer v. United 
States, 109 the Federal Circuit summarily affirmed the dismissal of the complaint, 
reasoning that the case was fimctionally identical to and therefore controlled by its 
decision in Williams. 110 A petition for certiorari was filed in May 2010, and the 
case has been on the Supreme Court's conference list regularly since the beginning 
of the current term, but no disposition of the petition has yet been announced. 111 
Although federal judges so far have been unsuccessful in challenging the 
withholding of cost-of-living adjustments, a month after the Federal Circuit's 
rejection of Beer, a group of New York State judges prevailed on a similar 
claim. In Maron v. Silver, 112 the New York Court of Appeals ruled that the state 
judiciary had been wrongly deprived of cost-of-living increases over an eleven-
year period during which the real value of judicial salaries had declined between 
25% and 33%. 113 
The decision did not rest on the state's Compensation Clause, 114 but rather on 
general principles of separation of powers. The legislature had not explicitly 
reduced judicial salaries nor had it passed any measure that discriminated against 
106 Williams, 535 U.S. at 921. 
107 United States v. Will, 449 U.S. 200, 229 (1980). 
108 Congress did not approve judicial salary adjustments for 2007 and 2010. Beer v. 
United States, 592 F.3d 1326, 1329 (Fed. Cir. 2010) (Newman, J., dissenting from denial of 
petition for hearing en bane), petition for cert. filed, 78 U.S.L.W. 3689 (U.S. May 14, 
2010) (No. 09-1395). Although not at issue in that lawsuit, federal judges also will not 
receive a pay raise in 2011. No COLA for Congress, Federal Judges· or Judiciary 
Employees, THIRD BRANCH, Dec. 2010, at 3. 
109 361 F. App'x 150 (Fed. Cir.), petition for hearing en bane denied, 592 F.3d 1326 
(Fed. Cir. 2010), petition for cert. filed, 78 U.S.L.W. 3689 (U.S. May 14, 2010) (No. 09-
1395). 
110 !d. at 151-52. 
111 As this article was going to press, the Supreme Court vacated the Feperal Circuit's 
judgment and remanded for consideration of whether the claim was precluded because 
members of the plairitiff class might have been bound by Williams. Beer v. United States, 
131 S. Ct. 2865 (2011). 
112 925 N.E.2d 899 (N.Y. 2010). 
113 !d. at 904. 
114 N.Y. CONST. art. VI, § 25(a) ("The compensation of a ... judge or justice shall be 
established by law and shall not be diminished during the term of office for which he or she 
was elected or appointed."). 
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· · dges economically. 115 Indeed, judicial pay remained frozen due to a political 
JU • 116 . h "d th h fr impasse over legislators' sall:).nes. Although t ere was ev1 ence at. t e . amers 
of the Compensation Clause were concerned about the effects of mflatwn on 
iudicial salaries, that evidence also suggested that the framers did not regard the 
~ffects of inflation as representing "a per se violation of the Compensation 
Clause." 117 Nevertheless, the political impasse between the governor and the 
legislature meant that those of~cials ~ad "fail[ ed] to consider judicial 
compensation increases on the ments, and mstead [held] them hostage to other 
legislative objectives."118 This in tum "threaten[ed] the structural independence of 
the Judiciary," which violated fundamental notions of separation of powers. 119 
Maron v. Silver did not explicitly hold that New York judges must receive 
cost-of-living pay increases. Requiring the political branches to consider the issue 
of judicial pay raises "on the merits" does not direct the governor and the 
legislature to approve such raises. 120 The court declined to direct any particular 
substantive result, reasoning that the judiciary should rarely inject itself into 
budgetary decisions. 121 Issuing a direct order probably was not necessary, as the 
parties accepted that the state judges "have earned and deserve a salary 
increase."122 Hence, addressing the question of judicial pay "on the merits" seems 
inevitably to foreshadow some kind ofupward salary adjustment. 123 
It is far from clear whether Maron v. Silver will provide support for the 
federal judges in Beer or their counterparts elsewhere in the nation. For one thing, 
the New York court thought that Hatter and other federal cases did not outlaw 
indirect diminution of judicial salaries as a result of inflation. 124 Of course, no state 
court can bind the Supreme Court on a matter of federal law, especially f~deral 
constitutional law, but the court's conclusion is consistent .with the Federal 
Circuit's position in both Williams and Beer. At the same time, some of the 
reasoning in Maron v. Silver appears to be inconsistent with the Supreme Court's 
view of the federal Compensation Clause. The New York court found no 
115 Maron, 925 N.E.2d at 910. 
116 Id at 904-05. 
117 Id at 911. 
118 Id at 914. 
119 Id. at 915. The court declined to decide whether current salaries of Empire State 
judges were too low, leaving that matter "in the first instance" to the legislature. Id at 916. 
120 See id. at 914. 
121 Id at 915. 
122 !d. at 904. 
123 The New York legislature responded to Maron v. Silver by authorizing a 
commission to make quadrennial recommendations. about judicial compensation. Act . of 
Dec. 10, 2010, 2010 N.Y. Consol. Laws Adv. Legis. Sei:-v. 567 (LexisNexis). Many judges 
have expressed dissatisfaction with this arrangement because any pay· increase that the 
commission might recommend would not take effect until 2012 at the earliest and in any 
event would not be guaranteed. See William G1aberson, Angry Over Pay, State Judges 
Want a Union-Like Group, a Survey Finds, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 12,2011, at A18. · 
124 Maron, 925 N.E.2d at 910. 
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· impennissible diminution of judicial salaries in part because legislators, the 
governor, and other constitutional officers also had not received pay raises. 125 In 
Will, however, the Supreme Court found it irrelevant that other federal officials 
suffered the same financial injury because those other officials did not enjoy the 
explicit protection against salary diminution that the Compensation Clause accords 
to Article III judges. 126 
At the same time, the persistent failure to provide New York judges with cost-
of-living increases over an eleven-year period appears to be a more compelling 
case for finding an impennissible ·diminution in judicial compensation than the 
erratic course of such increases for federal judges over the past two decades. Still, 
the 2001 federal legislation requiring speci'fic congressional approval for 
increasing judicial salaries might constitute the type of discrimination that could 
run afoul of the federal Compensation Clause. 127 Even if Congress has no 
constitutional obligation to award cost-of-living increases or set judicial salaries at 
any particular level, the question of how much judges should be paid deserves 
thoughtful consideration as a matter of policy. The next section offers an overview 
of some of the factors that warrant attention in any policy discussion. 
V. JUDICIAL COMPENSATION AS A POLICY ISSUE 
The failure to award federal judges cost-of-living increases in about one-third 
of the years since passage of the Ethics Reform Act has generated widespread 
criticism and concern. As noted earlier, Justice Breyer addressed the erosion of 
judicial compensation both in Hatter and in his dissent from the denial of certiorari 
in Williams. 128 Chief Justice Rehnquist regularly called attention to judicial 
compensation in his annual state of the judiciary report; 129 Chief Justice Roberts 
devoted his entire 2006 report to that subject130 and has referred to it in almost all 
125 !d. at 912. 
126 United States v. Will, 449 U.S. 200, 226 (1980); see supra note 17 and 
accompanying text. 
127 See supra notes 104-105 and accompanying text. 
128 See supra notes 85-86, 102 and accompanying text. 
129 See, e.g., WILLIAM H. REHNQUIST, CHIEF JUSTICE'S 2000 YEAR-END REPORT ON 
THE FEDERAL JUDICIARY 1-3; see also WILLIAM H. REHNQUIST, CHIEF JUSTICE'S 2003 
YEAR-END REPORT ON THE FEDERAL JUDICIARY 1; WILLIAM H. REHNQUIST, CHIEF 
JUSTICE'S 2001 YEAR-END REPORT ON THE FEDERAL JUDICIARY .1. All of these year-end 
reports, as well as those produced by Chief Justice Roberts, see infra notes 130-131, are 
available on the public information page of the Supreme Court's website. Chief Justice's 
Year-End Reports on the Federal Judicimy, SUPREME COURT OF THE U.S., 
http://www.supremecourt.gov/publicinfo/year-end/year-endreports.aspx (last visited Jan. 
15, 2011). 
130 JOHN G. ROBERTS, JR., CHIEF JUSTICE'S 2006 YEAR-END REPORT ON THE FEDERAL 
JUDICIARY 1-8 [hereinafter 2006 REPORT]. This document contains an appendix 
summarizing the federal courts' workload. 
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other reports. 131 Moreover, commentators and bar associations have decried the 
situation and called for higher judicial compensation to take account of inflation. 132 
Chief Justice Roberts summarized the main points of concern in his 2006 
report. Using 1969 as a baseline, he noted that in that year federal district judges 
were paid "21% more than the dean at a top law school and 43% more than its 
~enior law professors," whereas in 2006 federal district judges were making 
. ;,substantially less than-about half-what the deans and senior law professors at 
top schools [were] paid." 133 Moreover, during the same period the average 
American worker's real wages had risen by 17.8% while federal judges' salaries 
had declined by 23.9%.134 While compensation was eroding, the composition of 
the federal judiciary also has changed so its members "are no longer drawn 
primarily from among the best lawyers in the practicing bar."135 Almost two-thirds 
of President Eisenhower's appointees to federal district courts came from the 
private bar, while just over one-third came from the public sector. 136 Under 
President George W. Bush, however, less than 40% of district judges came to the 
bench from the private sector, while about 60% came from the public sector. 137 At 
the same time, attrition has. increased, with larger numbers of judges leaving the 
bench: thirty-eight judges have done so since 2000. 138 
Other critics have pointed to institutional problems associated with judicial 
attrition. For example, departing judges take with them experience and expertise 
that are difficult to replace. 139 Early departures result in larger dockets for 
remaining judges, at least until vacancies are filled, and the process for appointing 
judges has become increasingly time-consuming and contentious. 140 
These are legitimate concerns, but we should not uncritically accept the 
diagnosis of impending doom. First, it is important to consider the baseline against 
131 JOHN G. ROBERTS, JR., CIDEF JUSTICE'S 2008 YEAR-END REPORT ON THE FEDERAL 
JUDICIARY 7-8; JOHN G. ROBERTS, JR., CHIEF JUSTICE'S 2007 YEAR-END REPORT ON THE 
FEDERAL JUDICIARY 6-8; JOHN G. ROBERTS, JR., CHIEF JUSTICE'S 2005 YEAR-END 
REPORT ON THE FEDERAL JUDICIARY 3-5. Chief Justice Roberts's most recent report did 
not address judicial compensation but did note budgetary constraints and judicial vacancies 
as high-priority concerns. JOHN G. ROBERTS, JR., CHIEF JUSTICE'S 2010 YEAR-END 
REPORT ON THE FEDERAL JUDICIARY 5-8. 
132 See, e.g., AM. BARAss'N & FED. BARASS'N, FEDERAL JUDICIAL PAY: AN UPDATE 
ON THE URGENT NEED FOR ACTION (2003) [hereinafter FEDERAL JUDICIAL PAY]; Blake 
Denton, The Federal Judicial Salary Crisis, 2 DREXEL L. REv. 152 (2009). 
133 2006 REPORT, supra note 130, at 2. 
134 !d. at 3. 
135 !d. at 4. 
136 !d. at 3-4. 
137 !d. \ 
138 !d. at 6. The American Bar Association noted that "more than 100 Article III 
judge~ left the bench between 1990 and 2006, as did additional numbers ofbankruptcy and 
magistrate judges." AM. BAR ASS'N, BACKGROUND INFORMATION ON THE NEED FOR 
JUDICIAL PAY REFORM 2 (2007). 
139 F EDERAL JUDICIAL PAY, supra note 132, at 21. 
140 See id. at 21-22. 
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which we measure trends in the real value of judicial compensation. It is quite 
common to use 1969 for this purpose, but that year might bias conclusions about 
the effects of inflation. Federal judicial salaries increased substantially in 1969, 
reaching their highest value in real terms since 1913. 141 The whole point of the 
1969 pay raise was to inake up for stagnant salaries for officials in all tl1ree 
branches of the federal government. 142 Using 1986 as a starting point might 
suggest a different conclusion: in real terms, judicial salaries in 2006 were more 
than 14% higher than they were two decades earlier. 143 This comparison suggests 
that concerns about judicial compensation are exaggerated. It is also worth noting 
that the real value of judicial salaries was lower in 1986 than it was in any year 
since 195 5. 144 In other words, we should recognize that the choice of baseline can 
affect the interpretation of trends in judicial compensation. 
Second, it is also important to consider the baseline for assessing the 
background of newly appointed federal judges. Chief Justice Roberts focused on 
the Eisenhower administration, but that era might have been atypical. Eisenhower 
appointed an unusually high percentage of his district judges directly from private 
practice. 145 In recent years, more newly appointed federal district judges have had 
previous experience on the bench, either as state judges or as federal magistrate or 
bankmptcy judges. 146 It is possible that having a more "professional" federal 
judiciary has benefits both for the judiciary and for the public. 147 It also is possible 
that the disadvantages of such a system outweigh its benefits. What we can say, 
however, is that those who deplore the reduction in the propmiion of private 
141 KEVIN M. SCOTT, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RL 34281, JUDICIAL SALARY: 
CURRENT ISSUES AND OPTIONS FOR CONGRESS 19 (2008). 
142 FEDERAL JUDICIAL PAY, supra note 132, at 7. 
143 See SCOTT, supra note 141, at 40-41 (containing a chart indicating a 14% increase 
in real judicial salaries from $144,762 in 1986 to $165,200 in 2006). 
144 !d. at 20. 
145 Id. at 7-8 ("[T]he Eisenhower Administration appointed 65.1% of its federal 
judges from private practice, while no other administration since 1933 has appointed more 
than 55% of its federal judges from the same population."). 
It is also possible that, entirely apart from compensation considerations, the greater 
length and increasing contentiousness of the process for nominating and confirming federal 
judges has made the prospect of judicial service less attractive for private practitioners. The 
disruption affects any prospective judge, but is especially problematic for private 
practitioners who face pressure to recruit and retain clients in ways that public-sector 
lawyers do not. I am indebted to my fellow panelists at a November 2010 program on 
judicial vacancies sponsored by the Federal Bar Association for emphasizing the reluctance 
of potential nominees to put their personal and professional lives on hold for months if not 
years. For data on the duration of the confirmation process for recently confirmed judges, 
see RUSSELL WHEELER, BROOKINGS INST., JUDICIAL NOMINATIONS IN THE FIRST 
FOURTEEN MONTHS OF THE 0BAMA AND BUSH ADMINISTRATIONS (2010). 
146 See Russell Wheeler, Changing Backgrounds of US. District Judges: Likely 
Causes and Possible Implications, 93 JUDICATURE 140, 140-41 (2010). 
147 See id. at 142 (summarizing arguments in favor of a professionalized judiciaty). 
But see id. at 143 (summarizing arguments critical of a professionalized judiciary). 
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practitioners on the bench have not offered a systematic argument in support of 
. . 148 
their positiOn. · 
Third, advocates for increasing judicial compensation point to the number of 
judges who resign for financial reasons. Much of the evidence adduced in support 
.of this concern is anecdotal. 149 Even one analyst who found a statistically 
significant relation~h~p ben:een _com~ens~tion and resi~ation concedes t~a~ "[t]he 
total number of judicial resignatwns IS qmte low, even m recent years, so It rs hard 
to speak of a 'crisis' of resignations. "150 Another analyst noted tl:at "[j]udges have 
complained about the low salary of the office from the earliest years of the 
Republic"151 and found that, over the two centuries she studied, "judges who resign 
to take other employment, for whatever reason, still represent less than 5% of the 
judiciary."152 In other words, we should be concerned about the possibility that low 
salaries might lead some judges to leave the bench, but we also should not 
exaggerate the frequency with which this happens or assume that it is a strictly 
modern phenomenon. 
Fourth, we should recognize that the Compensation Clause might actually 
hold down judicial salaries by forbidding decreases in judicial pay. As noted at the 
outset, this ban on salaiy reduction plays an important role in protecting judicial 
independence. 153 Nevertheless, this "one-way compensation ratchet" 154 could very 
well make Congress reluctant to raise judicial salaries too readily because the 
Constitution prohibits downward adjustments if subsequent events put a strain on 
the federal budget. 155 Perhaps we should not expect judges and prospective judges 
to recognize this counterintuitive idea, but it at least suggests that while money 
might be important, it is not all that matters. This leads to one final point. 
Although judges should be paid fairly, we should not forget that judicial 
service offers more than financial rewards. If, as Chief Justice Roberts suggested at 
his confirmation hearing, the role of a judge is analogous to that of a baseball 
umpire, 156 the ability to decide rather than simply to argue must represent a 
148 See id. at 142---43. 
149 See, e.g., FEDERAL JUDICIAL PAY, supra note 132, at 14-15. 
150 Scott Duke Kominers, Salary Erosion and Federal Judicial Resignation 13 (Oct. 
28, 2010) (unpublished manuscript), available at http://ssm.com/abstract=l114432. 
151 Emily Field Van Tassel, Resignations and Removals: A History of Federal 
Judicial Service-and Disservice-1789-1992, 142 U. PA. L. REV. 333, 356 (1993). 
152 Id. at 364. 
153 See supra note 2 and accompanying text. 
154 Williams v. "United States, 535 U.S. 911 ,. 914 (2002) (Breye(, J., dissenting from 
denial of certiorari). 
155 See Adrian Vermeule, Selection Effects in Constitutional Law, 91 VA. L. REv. 953, 
985 (2005). 
156 Confirmation Hearing on the Nomination of John G. Roberts, Jr. to Be Chief 
Justice of the United States: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 1 09th Cong. 
55 (2005) (statement of John G. Roberts, Jr.) ("Judges are like umpires. Umpires don't 
make the rules, they apply them. The role of an umpire and a judge is critical. They make 
sure everybody plays by the rules, but it is a limited role. Nobody ever went to a ball game 
to see the umpire."). 
44 UTAH LAW REVIEW [No.1 
significant attraction. Recall the story about the umpire who, when asked whether a 
pitch was a ball or a shi.ke, replies: "It ain't nothing 'til I say so."157 Those who 
believe that the courts are facing a crisis of retention and recruihnent due to 
inadequate judicial salaries typically do not suggest what level of compensation 
they regard as appropriate or necessary to remedy the problem. Beyond that, we 
ought to be deeply skeptical about anyone who seeks a judicial position primarily 
for the salary. Charles Evans Hughes wisely observed that "we should be cautious 
about increasing the chance of drawing [people] to the public service who seek it 
for the sake of the compensation, " 158 and added that, "to attract good [people] and 
to secure efficiency, the honour and independence of the office are of far greater 
account than the emoluments that attach to it. "159 
VI. CONCLUSION 
Protecting judges against salary diminution is an important device to ensure 
their independence. The basic principle that judicial salaries may not be reduced 
seems well established, and the prospect of punitive or discriminatory taxes 
directed at the judiciary appears remote to say the least. The most challenging issue 
relating to judicial compensation concerns cost-of-living increases. Under existing 
doctrine, it is not clear that the simple failure to approve such increases violates the 
Compensation Clause because those increases might not have vested until the day 
that they actually would take effect. On the other hand, the statutory change which 
requires explicit congressional approval for judicial pay raises does pose 
troublesome constitutional questions. Under this arrangement, only judges must 
obtain legislative authorization for cost-of-living adjustments, while the Ethics 
Reform Act provides that all other covered officials receive such adjushnents 
automatically unless Congress passes blocking legislation. This differential 
treatment might well rise to the level of discrimination against the judiciary that 
the Supreme Court has found to contravene the Compensation Clause. 
157 Judge Dee Benson of the United States District Court for the District of Utah 
related this anecdote in his keynote address to the conference for which this paper was 
prepared. In Judge Benson's version, the batter was Ted Williams and the catcher was Yogi 
Berra, both American League stars; the umpire was not identified. I have heard the same 
story told about the legendary National League umpire Bill Klem (in that version, neither 
the batter nor the catcher was named). Of course, the specific participants in this episode 
are not the point of the story. 
158 CHARLES .EVANS HUGHES, CONDITIONS OF PROGRESS IN DEMOCRATIC 
GOVERNMENT 49 (1910). 
159 /d. at 50. 
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